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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TYING
ARRANGEMENTS: HAS THE MARKET POWER
PRESUMPTION REACHED THE
END OF ITS ROPE?
INTRODUCTION
U.S. Patent No. 6,293,874 covers an apparatus for paddling one's
own buttocks to amuse the user and viewers of the self-paddling.1 If,
as a condition of sale, the patent owner requires that buyers purchase
the unpatented paddling boots from her, another boot dealer may
have an antitrust claim against the patent owner for an illegal tying
arrangement.2 Because the machine is patented, the court would pre-
sume that the patent owner has market power, 3 making the case a
slam-dunk for the boot dealer. This is hardly a fair result, because it is
highly unlikely that the vast majority of patent holders have a market
for their products, much less power within that market. It is illogical
to presume market power based solely on the existence of a patent or
other form of intellectual property protection.
Accordingly, in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,
the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously eliminated the market power
presumption in patent tying arrangement cases.4 Should the presump-
tion be spared in copyright and trademark tying cases? 5 If, as this
1. User-Operated Amusement Apparatus for Kicking the User's Buttocks, U.S. Patent No.
6,293,874 (filed Jan. 4, 2000). The user stands on a platform, bends over, and rotates a crank that
rotates a paddling wheel. Id. As the crank is turned, the user receives repeated blows to the
buttocks from boots that are attached to the paddling wheel. Id.
2. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) (defining a tying ar-
rangement as "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the
buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product or at least agrees that he will not purchase that
product from any other supplier").
3. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) ("[I]f the Government
has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly over a product, it is fair to presume that the
inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the seller market power." (quoting Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1989))). Market power is the "ability to raise price by
restricting output . . . without a total loss of sales." 2 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICA-
TION 501 (2d ed. 2004).
4. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. at 46.
5. Because it was a patent case, the Court's broad declaration that "in all cases involving a
tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market power in the tying
product" constitutes mere dicta with respect to copyright and trademark cases. Id. (emphasis
added).
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Comment proposes, copyrights and trademarks are more analogous to
patents with respect to market power than copyrights and trademarks
are to trade secrets, then the Court should also eliminate the pre-
sumption in those areas.
This Comment addresses the market power presumption in four
types of intellectual property tying arrangements: patents, copyrights,
trademarks, and trade secrets. Part 1I discusses each type of intellec-
tual property tying arrangement 6 and the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in Independent Ink.7 Part III argues that copyright and
trademark laws are sufficiently analogous to patent and trade secret
laws to warrant abandoning the market power presumption for tying
arrangements involving those forms of intellectual property.8
II. BACKGROUND
This Part introduces the intersection between antitrust law and pat-
ent law and dispels common misconceptions thereof.9 Next, it sum-
marizes relevant law concerning tying arrangements in the antitrust
and patent contexts, including the recent Supreme Court decision in
Independent Ink.'0 Finally, it summarizes relevant law regarding tying
arrangements in related areas of intellectual property: copyrights,
trademarks, and trade secrets."
A. The Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law
Scholars once believed-and now widely repudiate-that intellec-
tual property law and antitrust law are at odds with one another.12
Intellectual property law authorize patent, copyright, trademark, and
6. The phrase "intellectual property" is sometimes used broadly to include any potentially
valuable human product, such as ideas, inventions, discoveries, symbols, images, and expressive
works. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 1 (2003). But in this Comment, "intellectual property" refers only to
those intellectual property rights granted by federal statute, state statute, or state common law.
Id.
7. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. at 28; see infra notes 9-131 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 132-222 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 23-82 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 83-131 and accompanying text.
12. ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 1110 (2002) ("Few courts or commentators today would
embrace the view that intellectual property rights and antitrust principles are inherently antago-
nistic, but courts and commentators do disagree on the degree of intellectual property protection
that is appropriate and necessary to spur innovation."). Landes and Posner noted that "[a] con-
sideration of the economics of intellectual property would be seriously incomplete without some
discussion of the intersection between intellectual property law and antitrust law." LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 6, at 372.
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trade secret "monopolies,"1 3 which seem to offend antitrust princi-
ples.14 The Supreme Court noted that it "has held many times that
power gained through some natural and legal advantage such as a pat-
ent, copyright, or business acumen can give rise to liability if a seller
exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire
into the next."15
But intellectual property and antitrust laws serve the same public
purpose. Patent and copyright grants encourage and reward innova-
tion and investment in the discovery and development of new technol-
ogies and artistic contributions. 16 Technological advances lead to
13. It is arguable that any form of intellectual property authorizes a "monopoly," but it is
perhaps more so with trademarks, as discussed infra notes 96-113. See also WILLIAM C.
HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 1:2 (2007) ("A patent is commonly
described as a 'limited monopoly.' Actually, this description is something of a misnomer. A
patent is a monopoly only in the narrow sense that it creates an exclusive right ... to make, use,
import, offer to sell, and sell the patented invention.").
14. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 372. The old view that intellectual property
conflicts with antitrust law is reflected in the famous "Nine No-No's" of 1972, presented by
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Wilson. David H. Marks, Patent Licensing and Anti-
trust in the United States and the European Economic Community, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 963, 968
(1986) (citing Bruce Wilson, Dep't of Justice Luncheon Speech, Law on Licensing Practices:
Myth or Reality? (Jan. 21, 1975)). The "Nine No-No's" deemed the following practices
unlawful:
(1) to require a licensee to purchase unpatented materials from the licensor; (2) for a
patentee to require a licensee to assign to the patentee any patent which [may] be
issued to the licensee after the licensing arrangement is executed; (3) to attempt to
restrict a purchaser of a patent product in the resale of that product; (4) for a patentee
to restrict his licensee's freedom to deal in the products or services not within the scope
of the patent; (5) for a patentee to agree with his licensee that he will not, without the
licensee's consent, grant further licenses to any other person; (6) as an extension of the
patent grant to permit mandatory package licensing; (7) for a patentee to insist, as a
condition of the license, that his license pay royalties in an amount not reasonably re-
lated to the licensee's sales of products covered by the patent-for example, royalties
on the total sales of products of the general type covered by the license patent; (8) for
the owner of a process patent to attempt to place restrictions in his licensee's sales of
products made by the use of the patented process; (9) for a patentee to require a licen-
see to adhere to any specified or minimum price with respect to the licensee's sale of
the licensed products.
Id. at 968 n.24. The "Nine No-No's" reflected the Antitrust Division's understanding of the law
on patent licensing restrictions. Id. at 968.
15. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480 n.29 (1992) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Professor Kurland commented on the Supreme Court's view that
patent law "monopolies" are in some cases contrary to the antitrust laws:
The legal monopoly that is conferred by patents and the illegal monopoly that is con-
demned by the national antitrust laws have provided the Supreme Court with the sub-
ject of some of its most noted opinions .... [One] side of the monopoly coin is to be
found in the patent laws which validate rather than strike down monopoly power.
PHILIP B. KURLAND, THE SUPREME COURT AND PATENTS AND MONOPOLIES i, xi (1974).
16. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
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"new and better products, more choices to consumers, and higher pro-
ductivity."' 7 Without the protections afforded to intellectual prop-
erty, there would be little incentive for inventors to develop new
products and processes or to market them to the general public, be-
cause they would be unable to reap the benefits of their investments.1 8
Antitrust laws promote and protect a competitive marketplace, which
benefits the public.19 The 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines ("the
Guidelines") set forth by the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission recognize the commonality between the goals of
intellectual property law and antitrust law:
The intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share the com-
mon purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer
welfare. The intellectual property laws provide incentives for inno-
vation and its dissemination and commercialization by establishing
enforceable property rights for the creators of new and useful prod-
ucts, more efficient processes, and original works of expression....
The antitrust laws promote innovation and consumer welfare by
prohibiting certain actions that may harm competition with respect
to either existing or new ways of serving consumers.20
In addition to serving a common goal, intellectual property law and
antitrust law work simultaneously, albeit in different ways, where nec-
essary to achieve their goal. Intellectual property owners generally
have the enforceable right to exclude others. 21 But antitrust law regu-
lates abuses of the grant of exclusivity "[w]hen a patent owner uses
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes disclosure of
inventions, to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice the in-
vention once the patent expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent protection
seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the
public.
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); see also Abbott Labs. v. Brennan,
952 F.2d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the patent grant of exclusivity serves "as an
incentive to invention, investment, and disclosure").
17. Roger B. Andewelt, Intellectual Property Antitrust: General Antitrust Principles, in INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 9, 21 (Practicing L. Inst. 1998).
18. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 72.01[1] (2d ed. 2004).
At the same time, however, legal protection against copiers who have not borne the cost of
creating the intellectual property prevents access to and use of the property by persons who
value that access at more than the marginal cost but less than the actual price. See LANDES &
POSNER. supra note 6, at 11.
19. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,
645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981).
20. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE Li-
CENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1.0 (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES].
21. See ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 23 (7th ed. 2005) ("[T]he
enforceability of restrictions on the use of patented goods derives from the patent grant, which
is, in classical terms of property, the right to exclude.").
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patent rights not only as a shield to protect the invention, but as a
sword to eviscerate competition unfairly." 22
B. Tying Arrangements
A tying arrangement-or "tie-in"-is an agreement whereby a ven-
dor sells a product or license subject to the condition that the pur-
chaser agrees to buy another independent product. 23  Tying
arrangements do not inherently violate antitrust laws.2 4 Nevertheless,
their exclusionary nature raises antitrust concerns: the arrangements
force customers to buy a second product whenever they buy the first,
thereby preventing that customer from purchasing the second product
from a rival seller.25
Courts scrutinize such arrangements under the Sherman2 6 and Clay-
ton Acts2 7 using a per se standard where: (1) the tied and tying prod-
ucts are "separate"; (2) an actual tie exists; (3) the party imposing the
tie has sufficient economic power in the market for the tying product;
and (4) a not insubstantial amount of commerce in the tied item has
been affected by the tie.2 8 Although courts have never found ties us-
ing a rule of reason analysis, this four-part per se rule functions like
the rule of reason,29 requiring the same vigorous market inquiry.30
22. Id.
23. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332
F.2d 505, 512 (2d Cir. 1964). See also HOLMES, supra note 13, § 20:1 ("Patent owners frequently
are interested not only in licensing the use of their patents, but in marketing related products
and services as well, such as component parts used in a patented product or auxiliary services
used to maintain the product.").
24. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); HOLMES, supra
note 13, § 20:1 (2006) ("Such dual marketing activities are of course not inherently illegal and
are a common business practice."). But see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,
305-06 (1949) ("Tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition.").
25. See 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
27. § 14.
28. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480 n. 29
(1992); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S.
Steel Corp. (Fortner 1), 394 U.S. 495, 498 (1969); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45
(1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). The per se treatment of tying
has its foundations in two early cases-United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States. 258 U.S.
451 (1922) and International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936). The
Court explicitly extended the per se rule to tying cases in International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947). In Fortner I, the Court set out the four-part test for determining the condi-
tions under which the per se rule could be invoked. 394 U.S. at 498-507. "Tie-outs," where a
buyer or licensee agrees to refrain from dealing in the goods of a competitor of the seller or
licensor, may also violate antitrust laws. See, e.g., United Shoe Mach. Corp., 258 U.S. at 457-58.
29. Courts generally analyze antitrust violations using either the rule of reason or a per se
standard. See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, IT 1507-1508. Under the rule of reason,
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The Supreme Court noted that, under a rule of reason analysis, chal-
lengers would have to establish the overall competitive unreasonable-
ness of the restraint within the tied or tying markets. 31 Such an
analysis would focus on a "thorough examination of the purposes and
effects of the practices involved" and how they impact competition in
the overall market for the "tied" item.32
This confusing standard "incurs the costs of a rule of reason ap-
proach without achieving its benefits: the doctrine calls for the exten-
sive and time-consuming economic analysis characteristic of the rule
of reason, but then may be interpreted [by lower courts] to prohibit
arrangements that economic analysis would show to be beneficial. '33
However, the Independent Ink Court settled this confusion by elimi-
nating the presumption completely. 34
C. Patent Tie-Ins
In patents tying arrangements, 35 "patent owners condition[ ] a li-
cense to use a patented combination, machine, or process upon the
purchase of unpatented supplies or components [by the licensee]. '36
Arguably, such arrangements extend the economic impact of the pat-
ent beyond the statutorily granted area of monopoly37 in that a paten-
tee is able to use the economic power of the patented product to
courts weigh the anti-competitive consequences of a practice against its pro-competitive benefits.
Id. Under the per se rule, a particular class of practices is declared illegal without detailed
inquiry into the merits of specific cases. Id. .9 1509-1511.
30. Fortner 1. 394 U.S. at 500.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 34 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
34. See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
35. Not all inventions are patentable; such protection is limited to any "new and useful pro-
cess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Therefore, to be patentable, an invention must be useful,
novel, and nonobvious, and the patent application must meet various disclosure requirements.
§§ 101-112. See also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470. 476-78 (1974): Thomas &
Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 283-84 (7th Cir. 1998). "Those inventions meeting
these statutory tests are granted patent protection, which gives the inventor a limited term of
monopoly on the manufacture or exploitation of the device." Thomas & Betts Corp., 138 F.3d at
284. A further discussion of patent law and the patentability requirements is beyond the scope
of this Comment. For a more detailed discussion, see MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW (2d ed. 2003).
36. 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04[1][b] (2004).
37. Id. § 19.04[2]; see also Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 70 (1912) (White, J., dissenting)
("[Patent tie-ins are] an attempt to increase the scope of the monopoly granted by a patent ...
which tend[s] to increase monopoly and to burden the public in the exercise of their common
rights.").
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control the market for unpatented products. 38 As courts, legislators,
and scholars now recognize, tying arrangements are only likely to be
harmful when, in addition to the statutory monopoly, the patentee en-
joys actual market power in the tying product.39 But, before the 1988
Amendment to the Patent Act in the patent misuse context and Inde-
pendent Ink in the antitrust context, courts presumed market power in
the patented tying product and held that such agreements were per se
unlawful. 40
The market power presumption for patent tying arrangements
stems from early tying cases where courts, perhaps carelessly, equated
the statutory "patent monopoly" with substantial market power, even
absent actual market power in the tying product.4' In the classic tie-in
case, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.,
the plaintiff sold his patented motion picture projector to theaters,
subject to the condition that theaters must not project movies other
than those supplied by the plaintiff or its designees. 42 Finding for the
defendant, the Court looked to "the scope and purpose of the patent
laws" and found that to permit such an arrangement would be
"gravely injurious to [the] public interest. '43 The Court did not em-
phasize market power, even though the patented projector was "ex-
38. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 47 (1962) (quoting United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 138, 158 (1948)).
39. 1988 Amendment to the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1988); Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v.
Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTI-
TRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND
COMPETITION (Apr. 17, 2007); ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 20.
40. Courts distinguish between intellectual property and non-intellectual property cases in
other areas of antitrust law as well. For instance, in refusal to deal cases, those involving a firm's
refusal to license intellectual property to competitors, antitrust flags are raised as being anti-
competitive. See Michael A. Carrier, Refusals to License Intellectual Property after Trinko, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 1191 (2006). In recent years, courts have held that, in intellectual property
cases, a firm may cease cooperating with rivals as long as the firm has a valid business justifica-
tion. Id. at 1194-95. In Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Office of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P.,
540 U.S. 398 (2004), the Supreme Court offered guidance to lower courts that have inconsis-
tently dealt with refusals to license intellectual property. In that case, a local telephone service
customer of AT&T alleged that Verizon, an incumbent local exchange carrier, discriminated
against competitive local exchange carriers in violation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Id. at 407. Holding that the telephone company's refusal to share its network with rivals did not
violate section 2 of the Sherman Act, the court focused on the benefits of monopoly power, the
dangers of forcing firms to share facilities with competitors, and the costs associated with anti-
trust regulation. Id. at 407-10. For more information on refusals to license, see 3 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, T 707.
41. 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1 1733; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 374
("[C]ourts in the early patent tie-in cases tended to confuse patent 'monopolies' with monopolies
that have economic consequences grave enough to warrant the invocation of antitrust
prohibitions.").
42. 243 U.S. 502, 506 (1917).
43. Id. at 519.
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ceedingly valuable" and gave the patent holder a vehicle by which to
"regiment the entire industry," clearly indicating potentially substan-
tial market power.44
However, in subsequent cases involving less commercially success-
ful patented inventions, courts overlooked actual market power and
continued to carelessly apply Motion Picture Patents' reasoning. 45 In
Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp., the
plaintiff patented a "transportation package consisting of a protective
casing of insulating material" containing "frozen carbon dioxide,"
commonly known as dry ice.46 The plaintiff sold the dry ice for use in
the patented package, thereby giving its customers an implied license
to make and use the patented package, which was effectively a license
conditioned upon the purchase of dry ice from the plaintiff.47 The
plaintiff argued that its rivals infringed by selling dry ice, knowing that
it would be used in the patented package. 48 The Court found patent
misuse by the plaintiff and analogized the unpatented dry ice to the
unpatented film in Motion Picture Patents, but did not consider the
patented package's lack of market significance. 49
In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., the Court again found non-
infringement without inquiring into the market power of the patented
tying product, but went a step further by allowing a plaintiff's tying
arrangement to constitute a defense to infringement. 50 There, the
plaintiff sold a patented salt-dispensing machine to food canners with
the agreement that the canners dispense only salt purchased from the
plaintiff.51 The defendant did not merely sell the same unpatented
product that the plaintiffs tied-in with its patented product; rather, it
manufactured and sold a salt-dispensing machine covered by the
claims of the plaintiff's patent.52 Nonetheless, the Court found for the
defendant, because the plaintiff used the patent to increase its sales of
unpatented salt-an "improper practice. '53 The Court reasoned that,
44. 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP. supra note 3. 1 1733.
45. Id.
46. 283 U.S. 27, 29 (1931).
47. Id. at 30.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 31-34; 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, T 1733.
50. 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942).
51. Id. at 490-91.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 493.
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had it held otherwise, it would have been a "powerful aid to the main-
tenance of the attempted monopoly of the unpatented article. '54
The Court's persistent inattention to actual market power in the ty-
ing product finally resulted in the per se rule against patent tie-ins in
International Salt Co. v. United States.55 In International Salt, the
plaintiff leased its patented salt-dispensing machine to food processors
with the understanding that the processors would only dispense the
plaintiff's salt.56 Without considering whether International Salt had
power in the market for salt-dispensing machines, the Court con-
demned the agreement under section 3 of the Clayton Act and section
1 of the Sherman Act. 57 Because the Court emphasized condemna-
tion without regard to the circumstances of the particular case, Inter-
national Salt has been understood to "establish liability without regard
to power over the tying product.158
Over the next fifty years, courts used per se condemnation of tying
arrangements in patent cases,59 while some courts increasingly criti-
cized the validity of treating tie-ins so harshly in non-patent tying
cases. 60 In Former Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner I), four
dissenting Justices argued that the tie-in probably served a legitimate
pro-competitive purpose, resulting in "uniquely advantageous deals"
to purchasers. 61 In U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. (Fort-
ner II), the Court agreed with Justice White's dissent in Fortner I and
found that the plaintiff's failure to prove market power was fatal to its
case.62 In Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, the Court
again found that a tying arrangement was not per se unlawful, because
the plaintiff failed to prove market power.63 The majority noted that
"[p]er se condemnation-condemnation without inquiry into actual
market conditions-is only appropriate if the existence of forcing is
probable. ' 64 Where the tying product is patented and the tied prod-
54. Id. Subsequently, in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.. the Court made
clear that such patent misuse through tying also violated antitrust laws. 320 U.S. 661. 664
(1944).
55. 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
56. Id. at 394.
57. Id. at 396.
58. 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3. T 1733.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
60. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner I), 394 U.S. 495, 517-18 (1969)
(White, J., dissenting); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc. (Fortner 11), 429 U.S. 610. 622
(1977). See also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
61. 394 U.S. at 516 (White, J., dissenting).
62. 429 U.S. at 622.
63. 466 U.S. at 25.
64. Id. at 15.
2008]
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uct unpatented, "it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the
product elsewhere gives the seller market power. ' 65 But Justice
O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, questioned the validity of such
a presumption, observing that it was actually a product of patent mis-
use jurisprudence rather than antitrust law. 66
Only four years after the Jefferson Parish Court reaffirmed the mar-
ket power presumption for patent tie-ins, Congress removed the pre-
sumption from the patent misuse context by enacting the Patent
Misuse Reform Act.67 The amended provision lists acts by patent
owners that shall not be deemed misuse, one of which concerns tying
arrangements:
(5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of
the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in an-
other patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of
the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the rele-
vant market for the patent or patented product on which the license
or sale is conditioned. 68
The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice fol-
lowed suit seven years later in their Guidelines.69 The Guidelines pro-
vide that litigants should challenge tying arrangements as anti-
competitive when: "(1) the seller has market power in the tying prod-
uct; (2) the arrangement has an adverse effect on competition in the
relevant market for the tied product; and (3) efficiency justifications
for the arrangement do not outweigh the anti-competitive effects. '70
Thus, the agencies recognized that merely possessing intellectual
property does not connote market power.71
D. Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink
In Independent Ink, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the
market power presumption72 in patent tie-in cases as a matter of anti-
65. Id. at 16.
66. Id. at 37-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000).
68. Id.
69. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 20. "The guidelines provide a useful insight into the
thinking of the antitrust authorities regarding the licensing of intellectual property." ADELMAN
ET AL., supra note 35, at 1100. "The guidelines also contain an analysis of various types of
markets affected by intellectual property and other antitrust issues such as horizontal restraints,
resale price maintenance, tying, exclusive dealing, cross-licensing and pooling, grant back
clauses, as well as acquisition of intellectual property rights." Id.
70. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 20, § 5.3.
71. Id. § 2.0.
72. As discussed above, it was a well-settled proposition that "if the Government has granted
the seller a patent or similar monopoly over a product, it is fair to presume that the inability to
buy the product elsewhere gives the seller market power." Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep.
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trust law. 73 The Court held that, because a patent does not necessarily
confer market power upon the patentee in all tying arrangement
cases, the party asserting patent invalidity due to illegal tying must
prove that the patent holder has market power in the tying product.74
The defendant in Independent Ink manufactured and marketed
printing systems to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). The
system included a patented printhead, patented ink container that at-
taches to the printhead, and unpatented ink. 75 The sale of the
printhead and ink container (the tying products) were contingent
upon the OEMs' agreement to also purchase the unpatented ink (the
tied product) exclusively from the defendant. The OEMs agreed that
"neither they nor their customers will refill the patented containers
with ink of any other kind. ' 76 The plaintiff developed an ink
equivalent to the defendant's unpatented ink and sought a judgment
of noninfringement and invalidity of defendant's patents on the
ground that the defendant "engaged in illegal tying and monopoliza-
tion in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act."'77
The District Court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the tying arrange-
ments were per se antitrust violations by virtue of the market power
presumption. 7 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, concluding
that it was bound by Supreme Court precedent regarding the market
power presumption in patent cases. 79
In reversing the Federal Circuit's holding, the Supreme Court
traced the development of the market power presumption and found
that the per se rule had become outdated, because the "Court's strong
disapproval of tying arrangements" had substantially diminished.80
The court stated the following:
Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (quoting Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S.
2 (1984)).
73. Id. ("The question presented to us today is whether the presumption of market power in a
patented product should survive as a matter of antitrust law despite its demise in patent law. We
conclude that the mere fact that a tying product is patented does not support such a
presumption.").
74. Id.
75. Id. at 31-32.
76. Id. at 32.
77. Id.
78. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. at 32.
79. Id. at 32-33. The Federal Circuit so held following "a careful review of the long history of
Supreme Court consideration of the legality of tying arrangements." Id. at 32 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
80. Id. at 35-36 (discussing the four-Justice dissent in Former I and the majority in Fortner II).
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While the 1988 amendment does not expressly refer to the antitrust
laws, it certainly invites a reappraisal of the per se rule .... It would
be absurd to assume that Congress intended to provide that the use
of a patent that merited punishment as a felony would not consti-
tute "misuse." Moreover, given the fact that the patent misuse doc-
trine provided the basis for the market power presumption, it would
be anomalous to preserve the presumption in antitrust after Con-
gress has eliminated its foundation.81
Thus, the Court reasoned that, because the market power presump-
tion had arisen "outside the antitrust context as part of the patent
misuse doctrine," which was eliminated in the 1988 amendments to
the Patent Act, the presumption should be abandoned in antitrust law
as well.82
E. Copyright Tie-Ins
Numerous courts have held that copyright 83 tie-ins-where a copy-
right owner refuses to license certain desirable products unless tied-in
with licenses for less desirable products-constitute antitrust viola-
tions.8 4 The older tie-in cases typically involved patents, while the
newer tie-in cases generally involve copyrights. 85 Supreme Court pre-
cedent in this area squarely establishes that proof of market power is
not required in copyright tie-in cases. 86 This rule is consistent with the
pre-Independent Ink market power presumption in patent tie-in cases.
81. Id. at 42.
82. Id. at 38. 42.
83. Like the Patent Act, "It]he Copyright Act accords to each copyright owner a limited form
of monopoly." 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.09(A)(1) (2007). Federal law gives the copyright owner, for a limited period of time, the
exclusive right to reproduce copyrighted works, prepare derivative works, distribute copies by
sale or other transfer by complete or partial ownership. and perform and display the copyrighted
work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
84. See United States v. Loew's, Inc.. 371 U.S. 38 (1962): United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265 (l1th Cir.
1999): Pape Television Co. v. Associated Artists Prod. Corp.. 277 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1960). See
also Interstate Circuit. Inc. v. United States. 306 U.S. 208 (1939): Elec. Data Sys. Corp. v. Com-
puter Assocs. Int'l. Inc.. 802 F. Supp. 1463 (N.D. Tex. 1992): In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust
Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980). Cf. A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc.. 806
F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986): United Tel. Co. v. Johnson Pub'g Co., 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988):
F.E.L. Publ'ns. Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi.. 214 U.S.P.O. 409 (7th Cir. 1982): Serv. & Train-
ing, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp.. 737 F. Supp. 334 (D. Md. 1990).
85. LANDES & POSNER. supra note 6, at 372. Copyright-related antitrust cases have grown
increasingly prevalent in recent years. as the economy has shifted toward computer and Internet-
based businesses. Id. at 390. "In recent years the focus of antitrust ... has been on firms in the
,new economy,' . . such as Intel .... Microsoft, and Internet-based businesses ... such as AOL
and Amazon.com." Id.
86. Hon. Arthur J. Gajarsa & Dr. Lawrence P. Cogswell III, Foreword, The Federal Circuit
and the Supreme Court. 55 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 839 (2006).
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In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. and United States v.
Loew's, Inc., the Supreme Court applied the same antitrust restric-
tions to copyright tie-ins as it did to patent tie-ins.8 7 In Paramount
Pictures, the Court condemned a tie-in without discussing market
power.88 The Court held that the practice of "block-booking," where
distributors rent copyrighted films to theaters who also agree to take
other films, "add[s] to the monopoly of the copyright in violation of
the principle of the patent cases involving tying clauses" by eliminat-
ing bidding for each movie on its individual merits.8 9 The Court rea-
soned that the market power presumption adopted in patent cases
applied equally to copyrights, because "copyright law, like the patent
statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration." 90 In
Loew's, the defendants-six major distributors of copyrighted motion
picture feature films-engaged in block-booking for television exhibi-
tion. 91 The Court noted that lower courts should deny relief in in-
fringement actions where patentees use unlawful tying arrangements.
The Court then applied this restriction to copyrights. 92 Some courts
read Loew's as suggesting that, as in patent law, a copyright misuse
defense to infringement could stand.93
Courts continue to apply this presumption in copyright cases. In
United States v. Microsoft Corp., the government claimed that
Microsoft unlawfully tied its copyrighted Internet browser to its Win-
dows 98 operating system, and the court rejected Microsoft's argu-
ment that the per se standard should not apply "simply because the
case involved 'physically integrated products or questions of product
design." 94 Elsewhere, courts have upheld tying arrangements, be-
cause the copyright was not a separate product. 95
87. 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). 371 U.S. 38. 45 (1962).
88. See Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 131.
89. Id. at 158.
90. Id.
91. Loew's. Inc., 371 U.S. at 40.
92. 4 NIMMER, supra note 83, § 13.09[A][4][a].
93. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); Mitchell Bros. Film Group
v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979); K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publ'g Corp., 372
F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967); Qad, Inc. v. ALN Assocs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
94. No. 98-1232, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14231, at *32-33 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998).
95. Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); Serv. & Training, Inc. v.
Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992); Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp.,
845 F. Supp 356 (E.D. Va. 1994).
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F. Trademark Tie-Ins
As with patents and copyrights, courts have scrutinized trademark 96
tying arrangements in the antitrust liability97 and trademark misuse
contexts.98 In the early trademark tie-in cases, courts declined to im-
pose antitrust liability, because judges have long assumed that a trade-
mark licensor could use tying arrangements as a legitimate part of
quality control. Nothing in the Lanham Act suggested otherwise, and
courts doubted that a trademark could constitute a tying "product." 99
Courts have also refused to apply trademark tie-in law where the
trademark was not a separate product, 00 the trademark was part of a
franchise agreement business format,10 1 or the tie-in was necessary to
maintain high product standards.10 2
Later cases involving trademark tie-ins "applied the logic of the pat-
ent and copyright holdings," relying on a presumption of market
power.10 3 Susser v. Carvel Corp. represents the modern judicial atti-
tude toward trademark tying arrangements. 04 There, franchise agree-
ments licensed the Carvel trademark and required franchisees to
purchase certain Carvel brand products. 0 5 Finding that the essential
96. A trademark is "any word, name, symbol or device or any combination thereof ... to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured
or sold by others .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). To be registrable as a trademark, a mark must
be capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods from the goods of others. Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). Marks are classified according to their distinctive-
ness and have been broken into the following categories: (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) sugges-
tive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful. Id. Generic marks are not registrable as trademarks, but
suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful marks are deemed distinctive and are entitled to such protec-
tion. Id. A descriptive mark, while not inherently distinctive, can be registered as a trademark if
it acquires secondary meaning, that is, "if it 'has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in
commerce.' Id. at 769 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)-(f) (2000)). A more in-depth discussion of
trademark law and acquiring trademark protection is beyond the scope of this Comment. See
generally MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW (2005).
97. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7) (2000); Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1976).
99. 2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE ET AL., GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.02[1][c] (2006).
100. See Roberts v. Elaine Powers Figure Salons, 708 F.2d 1476 (9th Cir. 1983); Principe v.
McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th
Cir. 1971).
101. A business format franchise conducts certain business under a common trademark, as
opposed to a distribution-type franchise system, which distributes the trademarked goods. See,
e.g., Principe, 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980); Siegel, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
102. Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961).
103. Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman
Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263, 370-71 n.599 (1986) (citing Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp.. 606
F.2d 704, 725 (7th Cir. 1979)); Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 463
F.2d 1002, 1015 (5th Cir. 1972); Siegel, 448 F.2d at 50.
104. 332 F.2d 505, 512 (2d Cir. 1964); KALINOWSKI, supra note 18, § 74.03[3].
105. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d at 509. "1 can find little reason to distinguish, in determining the
legality of an allegedly unlawful tying arrangement, between the economic power generated by a
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element in the franchise is the lease for the trademark itself, to which
the other products were tied, the Second Circuit held that the trade-
mark presumptively generated sufficient economic power and con-
cluded that the plaintiffs proved "the essentials of a tying
arrangement." 06
Subsequently, courts continued to rely on a market power presump-
tion. The Supreme Court has not overruled any of these cases. In
Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., the Seventh Circuit presumed mar-
ket power in the trademarked tying product.' 0 7 There, the franchise
agreement providing for the sale of the rights to retail drive-thru
photo processing kiosks bearing Fotomat's trademarked name also
obligated the plaintiff franchisee to purchase its processing services
from the defendant.'0 8 The Court found the agreement illegal, re-
jecting the defendant's argument that it lacked economic power in the
tying market without inquiring into actual market power. 10 9
In Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp., a
franchise agreement required franchisees of a refrigeration compres-
sor wholesale business to purchase rebuilt compressors, parts, and ser-
vices from the defendants. ' 10 The Fifth Circuit treated the trademark
as "persuasive evidence of significant market leverage" and remanded
the case for jury instructions on per se violations."' Similarly, in
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., the license to use the Chicken Delight
trademark was contingent upon certain supplies also being purchased
from the franchisor." 2 The Ninth Circuit found that an illegal trade-
mark tie-in existed and held that the presumption of market power for
patent and copyright tie-ins also applies to trademarks. 1
13
patent or copyright on the one hand and that generated by a trademark on the other." Id. at
513.
106. Id. at 514.
107. 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979).
108. Id. at 722.
109. Id. at 724.
110. 463 F.2d 1002, 1006 (5th Cir. 1972).
111. Id. at 1015.
112. 448 F.2d 43, 46 (9th Cir. 1971).
113. Id. at 50. The court explained as follows:
Just as the patent or copyright forecloses competitors from offering the distinctive
product on the market, so the registered trade-mark presents a legal barrier against
competition. It is not the nature of the public interest that has caused the legal barrier
to be erected that is the basis for the presumption, but the fact that such a barrier does
exist. Accordingly we see no reason why the presumption that exists in the case of the
patent and copyright does not equally apply to the trade-mark.
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G. Trade Secret Tie-Ins
Trade secrets1 4 may be the subject of tie-ins where the licensor
"conditions the availability of the trade secrets upon coerced accept-
ance of some other item. 11 5 But the exclusionary rights derived from
a trade secret are much narrower than those derived from a patent,
because competitors who do so fairly and honestly are free to develop
identical trade secrets." 6 The restrictive effect trade secret rights
have on competitors' abilities to develop equivalent technology, there-
fore, is less than that derived from patent, copyright, and trademark
rights.1 17
Courts have recognized that a trade secret is not a restraint of trade,
and a trade secret license does not inherently impose a restraint on
competition.' 8 In A&E Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., the Ninth
Circuit reviewed a trade secret licensing agreement and recognized
that, despite the license, the public retained the right to independently
develop the same product. 19
Further, courts have recognized that a tie-in is not illegal where the
tie-in results from an overriding business purpose rather than an at-
tempt to secure a competitive advantage. 20 In United States v. Jerrold
Electronics Corp., the Court held that the defendant's practice of sell-
ing cable equipment systems only in conjunction with a service con-
tract was lawful, in part, because, without the service contracts, proper
functioning of the system could not be guaranteed and "[a] wave of
system failures at the start would have ...been disastrous for the
business."' 2'
114. A trade secret is any commercially viable machine, device, product, formula, pattern,
compilation of information, or knowledge or skill that, when used in one's business, gives the
user an advantage over competitors who are unaware of the secret. KALINOWSKI, supra note 18,
§ 72.05.
115. HOLMES, supra note 13, § 28.1.
116. Id. A trade secret owner does, however, have a cause of action if the trade secret is
misappropriated. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines misappropriation as the "(i) acquisi-
tion of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade
secret was acquired by improper means; or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another
without express or implied consent ... UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (amended 1985).
117. HOLMES, supra note 13, § 28.1.
118. 2 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 11:2 (2002).
119. 396 F.2d 710, 714, 715 (9th Cir. 1968). But see Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d
665, 678 (Wash. 1987) (interpreting A.&E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th
Cir. 1968), to stand for the proposition that an "agreement purporting to license trade secrets,
which is in reality a mere sham to restrict competition, may violate antitrust laws").
120. See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd, 365
U.S. 567 (1961).
121. Id. at 557.
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However, courts have condemned trade secret tie-ins when tied to
patent licensing agreements.12 2 In such cases, the tying product is pro-
tected by other intellectual property rights in addition to trade
secrets. 123 In Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., the defendant
refused to license copyrighted software unless the buyers also pur-
chased the central processing units from the defendants. 124 The court
held that the copyright created a presumption of sufficient economic
power, making the arrangement illegal per se.' 2 5 In Susser v. Carvel
Corp., the defendant required-as part of a franchise agreement to
license the Carvel trademark and a secret ice cream formula-that the
plaintiffs buy certain products from either Carvel or an approved
source. 126 The court found that the true tying product was the trade-
mark and not the secret formula, noting that the sale of the secret
formula "surely could be legally tied to the Carvel trademark.'
27
Tie-in cases solely involving trade secrets are rare. 128 The few cases
in which the legality of a trade secret tie-in was at issue followed the
rule that "it has never been held that trade secrets protection is suffi-
cient to create a presumption of economic power. 112 9 In In re Data
General Corp. Antitrust Litigation, the plaintiff claimed trade secret
misappropriation, and the defendant raised unclean hands as a de-
fense, claiming that the plaintiff unlawfully tied the sale of software
protected by copyright, trademark, and trade secret rights. 30 The
court considered the trade secret aspect separately, noting that "[t]he
law does not presume that trade secrets protection confers economic
power."131
122. KALINOWSKI, supra note 18, § 74.01[4][b] (citing Technograph Printed Circuits v. Bendix
Aviation Corp., 218 F. Supp 1 (D. Md. 1963)).
123. See, e.g., Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984); Susser v.
Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964); Perfumer's Workshop, Ltd. v. Roure Bertrand du
Pont, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); KFC Corp. v. Marion-Kay Co., 620 F. Supp. 1160
(S.D. Ind. 1985); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648 (D.S.C. 1979).
124. Digidyne Corp., 734 F.2d at 1338.
125. Id. at 1344.
126. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d at 510-11.
127. Id. at 519 n.2.
128. JAGER, supra note 118, at § 11:10.
129. Id. (quoting In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089,1113-14 (N.D. Cal.
1980); and 3 P.M., Inc. v. Basic Four Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (E.D. Mich. 1984)).
130. 490 F. Supp. at 1099.
131. Id. at 1115.
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III. ANALYSIS
This Part analyzes the rationale behind the Independent Ink rule 32
and the rule that courts apply to trade secret tie-ins. 33 It proposes
that a similar rule should be adopted in cases involving tie-ins with
two other forms of intellectual property: copyrights and trade-
marks. 34 Specifically, it compares copyrights to patents and proposes
that such an extension of the law is warranted, because they serve
similar public policies and the right to exclude competitors conferred
by copyrights has even less potential for competitive harm than that of
patent rights. 135 It then compares trademarks to patents and proposes
that logic dictates the same extension of the law, because trademark
rights serve an important public purpose that should not be deterred,
and because trademark rights are far less exclusionary than patent
rights.1 36 Finally, this Part compares trade secrets to patents, copy-
rights, and trademarks to show that a rule used in both patent and
trade secret contexts should apply equally to copyrights and
trademarks. 37
A. The Independent Ink Court Got It Right
The Independent Ink Court correctly held that antitrust scrutiny of
tying arrangements should be the same for all products. 138 A patent is
not a "monopoly" in the antitrust sense, because "a patent does not
necessarily confer market power.' 39 A patent is no different from
any other property right, and, unless the property owner dominates its
relevant market, neither patent ownership nor the power to exclude
others conveys monopoly power.140 Thus, it was a mistake for judges
132. See infra notes 138-164 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 114-131 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 165-206 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 165-188 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 189-206 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 207-222 and accompanying text.
138. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45-46 (2006). The vast majority
of authorities agree with the decision. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust
Reform: "Blessed be the Tie?", 4 HARV. J. LAw & TECH 1, 57 n.340 (1991) (citing sources regard-
ing the extensive criticism of the market power presumption).
139. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. at 44.
140. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 159:
[W]e emphasize that a patent is presumptively not a monopoly at all; it is merely the
right to exclude others from copying a particular process or product. As such it is no
different from any other property right .... Although courts in the past "presumed"
that a patent confers sufficient market power to make tying unlawful, the presumption
is incorrect there and has not been extended to § 2 cases.
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in early tie-in cases to presume that patents confer monopolies.' 4'
The availability of acceptable noninfringing alternatives to the tying
product eliminates the inference that the mere existence of a patent
confers market power.142
In some circumstances, patent tie-ins may be reasonably justified,
which negates the usefulness of a blanket presumption of market
power. 143 Such instances include situations where the tied product is
not compatible with products other than the patentee's licensed prod-
uct or where the patentee's business is new and the patentee had a
legitimate interest in assuring the proper functioning of complex
equipment. 144 Sellers may also use tie-ins to facilitate price discrimi-
nation, 45 rather than use the seller's existing monopoly to acquire a
second monopoly. 146  Price discrimination is "a relatively harmless
nonleverage explanation of tying," where a "tying seller uses the tie
simply to maximize its revenues from the tying product through price
discrimination." 147
Further, when courts presume market power, they overlook pro-
competitive benefits and thus fail to serve antitrust law's underlying
policy: fostering competition. 48 Tying can save costs, increase effi-
141. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 374.
142. Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Current Antitrust Division Views on Patent Licensing Practices, 50
ANTITRUST L.J. 515, 518-19 (1981).
143. KALINOWSKI, supra note 18, § 74.01[4][a]; GAVIL ET AL., supra note 12, at 711.
144. KALINOWSKI, supra note 18, § 74.01[4][a] (citing Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961): United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D.
Pa. 1960)).
145. Price discrimination is the practice of charging competing buyers different prices for the
same product. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Promoting Competition, Protecting Consumers: A
Plain English Guide to Antitrust Laws, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/compguide/discrim.htm
(last visited Sept. 16, 2007). Such practices may be anti-competitive if sellers give their favored
customers an edge in the market, unrelated to the customer's efficiency. Id. Further, such prac-
tices may facilitate predatory pricing-pricing at a loss for certain customers in order to drive
competitors out of the market, while charging other customers higher prices to recoup the losses.
Id. Nevertheless, price discrimination is generally lawful, "particularly if [prices] reflect the dif-
ferent costs of dealing with different buyers or result from a seller's attempts to meet a competi-
tor's prices or services." Id. Kalinowski stated the following:
Under the proper circumstances, the courts and the Commission allow sellers to charge
different prices among customers at different levels of distribution. Those differentials,
however, must correspond to the particular customer's position on the distribution lad-
der, so that a wholesaler or jobber must receive a higher discount (and therefore a
lower price) than a dealer or retailer.
KALINOWSKI, supra note 18, § 39.02[2][a][i].
146. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 373 (2003) (discussing Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224
U.S. 1 (1912)); 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, $ 1711.
147. 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1711 (emphasis in original).
148. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911); SCM Corp. v. Xerox
Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981).
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ciency, 1 49 or assure product quality.1 5 0 In some instances, tying may
also provide convenience. 51 Consider the following scenario:
Suppose for example that 80% of the purchasers of widgets also
want gadgets, that gadgets cost $1 to produce, and that the incre-
mental cost of packaging gadgets separately from widgets is $0.30.
In this example, it is cheaper to provide a gadget for those who do
not want it (a cost of $1 per customer for 20% of the customers)
than it is to package the goods separately ($0.30 per customer for
80% of the customers). Customers who want both widgets and gad-
gets are likely to get a lower price than they would if the company
were forced to sell the goods separately.152
Tying can also be used for product quality assurance, as where a seller
ties a complementary product to a durable product.1 53 In so doing,
the seller can control the durable product's quality by controlling the
complementary product's quality without resorting to more expensive
contractual quality provisions.1 54
However, critics may argue that a presumption of market power
may be appropriate where less-restrictive alternatives are available. 155
If it is true that, where the defendant is able to prove legitimate busi-
ness justification, the plaintiff is usually able to prove the existence of
less-restrictive means of accomplishing the same business purpose,
149. Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law And Policy: A Decision-Theoretic Ap-
proach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469, 504 (2001).
150. See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 12, at 712: Mark R. Patterson, Coercion, Deception, and
Other Demand-Increasing Practices in Antitrust Law, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 62 n.275 (1998); Ma-
rius Schwartz & Gregory J. Werden, A Quality-Signaling Rationale For Aftermarket Tying, 64
ANTITRUST L.J. 387, 397 (1996).
151. Hylton & Salinger, supra note 149, at 485.
152. Id. at 503.
153. See Patterson, supra note 150, at 62 n.275; Schwartz & Werden, supra note 150, at 397.
154. See, e.g.. Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 656-57 (1st Cir.
1961) (holding that a patentee could reasonably refuse to sell his patented silo unloading device
to competitors where the patentee demonstrated that the device tended to seriously malfunction
unless used in conjunction with its own silos); Patterson, supra note 150, at 62 n.275 ("And in the
case in which a seller uses a tie in lieu of more costly contractual protections-of quality, for
example-the tie may be necessary because, though the improved quality benefits all buyers, in
the absence of the tie some might free ride on the others' efforts."); Schwartz & Werden, supra
note 150, at 395 ("[T]he principal pro-competitive rationale for tying was that it may be used to
prevent tarnishing of the quality image of the durable product through the effects of poor per-
formance caused by the use of inferior complements.").
155. HOLMES, supra note 13, § 34:3 ("[T]he Courts have emphasized that the party seeking to
rely upon a business justification defense must establish not only the competitive necessity of the
arrangement, but the absence of some less restrictive alternative that might, instead, have been
employed.").
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then simply presuming market power in the first place would achieve
the same outcome. 156
Nonetheless, there is near consensus in the intellectual property
community that Independent Ink was correctly decided. Many of the
amici curiae urged the Court to abandon the market power presump-
tion for not only patents, but also copyrights and other forms of intel-
lectual property. 5 7 The Motion Picture Association of America
asked the Court to "decline to presume that antitrust market power
arises from the mere ownership of intellectual property rights,
whether patents or copyrights," arguing that such a presumption is not
grounded in the Court's precedents or its modern market power juris-
prudence and "clashes with the Court's teaching that antitrust pre-
sumptions should reflect market realities and sound economic
reasoning."'1 58 The Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago
similarly argued that "[t]he presumption makes little sense," because
it is inconsistent with current jurisprudence, is a "disincentive to inno-
vation," and the "potential benefits of the presumption are specula-
tive and do not outweigh this disincentive. 1' 59 The Patent, Trademark
& Copyright Section of the Bar Association of the District of Colum-
bia urged the Court to clarify that patents are not per se monopolies
under antitrust laws and that the market power presumption arose in
part from semantic confusion between the legal monopoly granted to
patent owners and the legal monopoly of antitrust law. 160
However, a minority of commentators have argued that Indepen-
dent Ink was wrongly decided. The International Imaging Technology
Council and Remanufacturing Industries Council, in their amicus cu-
riae brief, argued that the presumption of market power is vital to the
survival of the print cartridge remanufacture industry.1 61 The councils
provided extensive evidence that the market structure is such that, if
156. See, e.g., County of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001)
(shifting the burden back to the plaintiff to demonstrate less restrictive alternatives upon a show-
ing by defendants of legitimate business objectives).
157. Brief for the Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner at 4, Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (No. 04-1329), 2005
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 523.
158. Id.
159. Brief of the Intellectual Property Law Ass'n of Chi. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (No. 04-1329), 2005 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 482.
160. Brief of the Bar Ass'n of the Dist. of Columbia-Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28
(2006) (No. 04-1329), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 522.
161. Brief of the Int'l Imaging Techn. Council & Remanufacturing Indus. Council as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 5, Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28
(2006) (No. 04-1329), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 656.
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the large OEMs are permitted to condition their hardware sales on
the purchase of ink, they will be able to completely eliminate competi-
tion from their smaller remanufacture rivals. 162
Other scholars support a rebuttable presumption of market power,
which would require the defendant to put forth sufficient evidence
that market power is lacking. 63 For example, Professor Scherer ar-
gued, as amicus curiae, that the vast majority of litigated patents are
valuable; thus, courts may presume that the patented product at issue
is dominant in its relevant market, because it would otherwise not be
valuable to the holder and would not be worth litigating.1 64 However,
Independent Ink eliminated the presumption entirely, placing the bur-
den of proving market power on the party asserting illegal tying.
162. The potential risks to the remanufacturing industry were summarized as follows:
The current state of the law permits the cartridge remanufacturing industry to continue
to compete and provide price relief to consumers .... The loss of the presumption of
market power could greatly increase litigation risks and costs for the small businesses
that provide this vital competition in the ink business.
Id. at 8.
163. 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1735e. An antitrust plaintiff is no different
from any other plaintiff in that he "bears the burden of proof for each element necessary for its
cause of action." Id. "Because the defendant's power in the tying market is such an element, the
plaintiff must prove it." Id. The plaintiff will then "prevail unless the defendant then offers
evidence that would make such a conclusion unreasonable." Id. A rebuttable presumption of
market power acts as "the initial conclusion[ ] with which a reasonable factfinder begins," reliev-
ing the plaintiff of his initial burden and shifting the burden to overcome the presumption to the
defendant. Id. Such presumptions vary in strength and "[lhow strong any presumption should
be-that is, what is necessary to overcome it-depends on the particular presumption." Id.
164. Brief of Professor F.M. Scherer as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2-3, Illinois
Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (No. 04-1329), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 651. Professor Scherer stated that "[t]he willingness of plaintiffs in American judicial
proceedings to expend such large sums demonstrates that the patents at issue are among the few
patents with truly significant value.... And the value of a particular patent corresponds to that
patent's economic power." Id. at 7, 8. In his brief, Professor Scherer goes on to state the
following:
The essence of the patent privilege is the right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling that which is covered by the patent during its life. The value of this right de-
pends upon how valuable the product or process is to users. This in turn depends upon
the closeness of substitute products or processes, patented or unpatented, which are
available. When a patented product or process is not "better" in this sense no return to
the patentee is possible. Many patents are economically useless. On the other hand.
when a patent is "good enough," and when its substitutes are remote, it may provide
the patentee a very substantial return. It may give the patent holder enough economic
power to substantially "control the market" in the field in which the patent applies.
But "control of the market," an invidious description in the absence of a legal monop-
oly, when a patent is involved, is merely a description of the patent's value.
Id. (quoting WARD S. BOWMAN, JR.. PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
APPRAISAL 53 (1973)).
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B. Copyrights
Courts should eliminate the market power presumption in the copy-
right tie-in context. This extension of patent tie-in law to copyrights-
a closely related area of intellectual property, as discussed below 165-
is logical. The same policy rationale applies to copyrights, 166 and the
right to exclude competitors conferred by copyrights has even less po-
tential for competitive harm than that provided by patent rights.1 67
Historically, courts have recognized that antitrust principles that apply
to patents may also apply to copyrights. 68 Such a rule would also
encourage software creators to copyright and disclose their creations
to the public, rather than resort to the more favorable law of trade
secret protection. 169
Copyright and patent law are both rooted in the constitutional man-
date to "promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts." 170 Copy-
right law does so by securing "a fair return for an author's creative
labor in the short run, while ultimately seeking to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good. 1171 Put another way, "[t]he sole
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the
labors of authors" and "reward to the author or artist serves to induce
release to the public of the products of his creative genius."'1 72 Patents
similarly reward inventors for giving the public new innovations, en-
couraging them to invest in innovation and disclose such innovations
to the public. 173
165. See infra notes 174-188 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 170-173 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 174-180 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 181-184 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 185-188 and accompanying text.
170. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. One scholar has stated the following:
Notwithstanding the historical independence of patent and copyright from one another,
both regimes have a common overall goal. They seek to promote the general welfare
by protecting the fruits of intellectual creativity from activities that would undermine
the author's or inventor's ability to reap a fair return from investments of time, money,
or talent.
Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439,
441 (2003).
171. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1215 (9th Cir. 1997) (in-
ternal citations omitted) (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken. 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975)).
172. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (quoting Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
173. Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in Their
Proper Place. 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 238 n.95 (2006) ("Providing an incentive to disclose an inven-
tion is a well-established function of patent law." (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1029-30
2008]
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Market power cannot necessarily be inferred from copyrights any
more than from patent rights, because the exclusive right accorded by
copyright is much less powerful than that granted by patent.174 Copy-
right law provides a cause of action against individuals who copy the
protected work of authorship, as long as the copy is substantially simi-
lar to the copyrighted design. 175 However, copyrights do not protect
designs that are substantially similar but independently created. 76
Patents are more exclusionary, because they confer the right to ex-
clude inventors who independently, but subsequently, invent the same
invention. Although copyright protection is usually easier to secure
and longer lasting, 177 "patent protection is more powerful [for] curb-
ing competitors."1 78 Additionally, copyright law provides more liberal
exceptions to infringement liability than does patent law, mainly
through application of the fair use doctrine, which exempts from lia-
bility some uses for purposes "such as criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research.' 79 Fair use exempts
many more uses of copyrighted materials "than does patent law with
regard to activities that on their face may appear infringing."' 18 0
Moreover, courts should align the market power presumption for
copyrights with patent cases, because courts in tie-in cases generally
apply the law regarding patent ties to those involving copyrights. In
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., the Court held that the
block-booking of copyrighted films "add[ed] to the monopoly of the
copyright in violation of the principle of patent cases involving tying
clauses."' 8 1 Similarly, in United States v. Loew's, Inc., the Court ap-
plied the Paramount Pictures reasoning to a similar copyright block-
(1989): and Edmund W. Kitch. The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265. 278 (1977))).
174. ROBERT A. GORMAN. COPYRIGHT LAW 6 (2d ed. 2006).
175. See LAFRANCE, supra note 96.
176. Id.
177. The 1909 Copyright Act granted an initial twenty-eight-year term of protection and a
twenty-eight-year renewal term. GORMAN. supra note 174. at 55. The 1976 Copyright Act aban-
doned the renewal format and changed the term of protection to the author's life plus fifty years.
Id. In 1998. the Copyright Term Extension Act extended the term to the author's life plus sev-
enty years. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302. 304 (2000).
178. GORMAN. supra note 174. at 7.
179. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). Accord WILLIAM F. PATRY. THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN CoPY-
RIGHT LAw (2d ed. 1995): WILLIAM F. PATRY. LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 239-55 (6th ed.
1986).
180. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis Of Seller And User Liability
In Intellectual Property Law. 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 1. 12 (1999) (discussing the reasons why the rule
relating to user liability is so different from the rule followed in trade secret, copyright, and
trademark law).
181. 334 U.S. 131. 158 (1948).
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booking case to find the tie-in illegal.1 82 In Lasercomb America, Inc.
v. Reynolds, the Fourth Circuit allowed a copyright misuse defense to
stand, reasoning that "a misuse of copyright defense is inherent in the
law of copyright just as a misuse of patent defense is inherent in pat-
ent law."1' 83 The Independent Ink Court discussed Loew's and Para-
mount Pictures and concluded that tying arrangements involving
patented products should not be evaluated under the Loew's per se
standard.1 84
Furthermore, the presumption of market power in copyright cases
may discourage software producers from acquiring copyright protec-
tion. The copyright bargain requires creators of literary or artistic
works to forgo trade secret protection in exchange for sharing their
works with the public. 1 5 Despite the drawbacks of trade secret pro-
tection,1 86 the current state of antitrust law in copyright tie-in cases
may serve as a disincentive for authors or artists to choose copyright
over trade secret protection. 87 This is an especially important consid-
eration, given that the economy continues to shift toward computer
and Internet-based businesses.1 88
182. 371 U.S. 38, 46 (1962).
183. 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990).
184. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink. Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42 (2006) ("[W]e conclude that
tying arrangements involving patented products should be evaluated under the standards applied
in cases like Fortner 11 and Jefferson Parish rather than under the per se rule applied in Morton
Salt and Loew's.").
185. See, e.g.. I WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 2.47 ("Congress has clearly
sought to further the important public purposes . . .of rewarding the creators of copyrighted
works and of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.").
186. To protect a trade secret, secrecy is required, making it difficult for authors of software
and other works to sell or license their works, because it is difficult to persuade someone to pay
for an undisclosed idea. Once it is disclosed, the author has nothing left to sell. See Bagley,
supra note 173, at 274 n.95 (discussing this trade-off in the patent context). And "copyright in a
computer program protects only against copying the sequence of commands .... It does not
prevent a person from replicating the process that the computer program implements, provided
there is no copying of the program." GORMAN, supra note 174. at 5. Patent protection of the
production process, including the program. may be more protective where the patentability re-
quirements are met, as it will preclude others from using the process even if independently
originated. Id.
187. JAGER. supra note 118, § 11:01 (noting that the dichotomy between the market power
presumption law of copyrights and trade secrets "may be an important consideration in deciding
whether to protect software by copyright or as a trade secret").
188. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 390. ("[F]ocus of antitrust in regard to intellectual
property has been on firms in the 'new economy,' . . . such as Intel.... Microsoft. and Internet-
based businesses ... such as AOL and Amazon.com."). One scholar further stated as follows:
[C]omputer software may be protected under the patent. copyright and trade secrets
laws .... [T]rade secret law is emerging as probably the most appropriate protection
.... At least under current law and practice, patent and copyright protection each
have significant drawbacks and may, indeed, be currently serving to some degree to
unnecessarily impede technological and commercial progress.
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D. Trademarks
Courts should also eliminate the market power presumption in the
trademark tie-in context. Such a change in the law is logical, given
that trademark rights serve an important public purpose that should
not be deterred 8 9 and that trademark rights are far less exclusionary
than patent rights. 190 If courts do not eliminate the presumption, they
will confuse its applicability in cases where trademarked products are
also patented or copyrighted.1 9' Furthermore, it makes sense to align
the law regarding the market power presumption, because courts have
applied the logic of patent and copyright tie-in cases to trademark tie-
in cases.1 92
Trademarks serve a public interest somewhat distinct from that of
patents and copyrights. The public purpose of patents and copyrights
stems from the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he Congress shall
have the power.., to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. 1' 93 To carry out
this objective, patent law offers "a right of exclusion for a limited pe-
riod as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in
terms of time, research, and development. ' 194 By contrast, the Con-
stitution does not mention trademarks. Rather, the Lanham Act pro-
tects trademarks and provides an aggrieved party a federal cause of
action against anyone who, "on or in connection with any goods...
uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof" in a manner that is likely to cause confusion as
to the product's origin.195 The Lanham Act serves the following pur-
poses: (1) it protects the public from confusing and deceptive trade-
marks; and (2) it provides security against misappropriation for
trademark owners who have invested resources in presenting their
products to the public, ensuring that they have the sole right to exploit
whatever goodwill the merits of their product warrant. 96 Unlike pat-
GALE R. PETERSON, TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN AN INFORMATION AGE § 1.2 (1997).
189. See infra notes 193-197 and accompanying text.
190. See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
191. See infra notes 203-204 and accompanying text.
192. See infra notes 205-206 and accompanying text.
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
194. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470. 480 (1974).
195. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114. 1125(a) (2000).
196. The Court summarized the purposes of the Lanham Act as follows:
The Lanham Act provides national protection of trademarks in order to secure to the
owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of consumers
to distinguish among competing producers. National protection of trademarks is desir-
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ent and copyright protection, trademark protection has evolved not
from the desire to promote innovation and creativity, but from the
belief that it is in the pubic interest that consumers recognize the
goods and services of a particular provider and are able to distinguish
those goods or services from the goods or services of another
provider. 197
Moreover, trademark rights are far less exclusionary than patent
rights, making a presumption of market power for trademarks even
more illogical than for patents. Trademark rights are nonexclusionary,
compared with the exclusionary rights associated with patent and cop-
yright, because they do not give the trademark owner exclusive rights
over the production, use, or sale of products or services. 198 Trademark
rights prevent competitors from using the same or confusingly similar
marks in a way that may mislead consumers, but trademarks do not
protect against all unauthorized uses of the mark-only against uses in
connection with the offering of goods or services. 199 Patent rights, on
the other hand, prevent others from making, using, selling, or offering
to sell any identical or obvious variation of the patented invention,
regardless of whether that use is in connection with the offering of
goods or services or whether the invention was copied or developed
independently.200 But trademarks give their owners a monopoly over
use of the trademark in marketing products,20 1 and the Lanham Act
will not protect a trademark where it "has been or is being used to
violate the antitrust laws of the United States. '202
able, Congress concluded, because trademarks foster competition and the maintenance
of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.
Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (internal citations omit-
ted). See also KALINOWSKI, supra note 18, § 72.04[1].
197. KALINOWSKI, supra note 18, § 72.04[1]. The Federal Circuit stated the following:
Although the protection of trade identification is a goal of the Lanham Act, § 43(a)
seeks an appropriate balance among the divergent policies of protecting and encourag-
ing creators and enabling fair competition by copiers, with the purpose of protecting
consumers from confusion or palming off, while enhancing the consumer benefits of
competition.
L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
198. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
199. See LAFRANCE, supra note 96. An available defense to trademark infringement is "fair
use" of the trademark where the allegedly infringing use of the mark is "a use, otherwise than as
a mark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or of the individual name of anyone
in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in
good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin." 15
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). See also GILSON, supra note 99, § 11.08[3][d].
200. See LAFRANCE, supra note 96.
201. KAuNOWSKI, supra note 18, § 72.01[1].
202. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7) (2000).
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Furthermore, it is illogical and impractical to apply two different
standards to tie-in cases where a product is both trademarked and pat-
ented.20 3 Courts have "consistently held that a product's different
qualities can be protected simultaneously, or successively, by more
than one statutory means for protection of intellectual property. '20 4
In such a case, it would be impossible for a court to presume that the
patented aspect of a product conferred market power, while the trade-
marked aspect did not.
Because courts have applied the logic of patent tie-in cases to copy-
right tie-in cases, it follows that the law with respect to the presump-
tion of market power may also be applicable to trademark law. For
example, in Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that
the presumption of market power for patent and copyright tie-ins also
applies to trademarks. 20 5 The court stated the following:
Just as the patent or copyright forecloses competitors from offering
the distinctive product on the market, so the registered trade-mark
presents a legal barrier against competition. It is not the nature of
the public interest that has caused the legal barrier to be erected
that is the basis for the presumption, but the fact that such a barrier
does exist. Accordingly we see no reason why the presumption that
exists in the case of the patent and copyright does not equally apply
to the trade-mark. 20 6
The same reasoning should apply to eliminate the presumption of
market power in trademark cases.
E. Trade Secrets
Tie-ins involving only trade secrets are not-and have never been-
subject to the market power presumption.20 7 "Although trade secrets
and patents have many similar intellectual property attributes, and ac-
complish many of the same public policy goals, [trade secrets] differ
markedly in the features and characteristics pertinent to antitrust law.
The most significant difference is in monopoly power. '20 Due to
these inherent distinctions, trade secrets are much harder to fit into
the "mold of a patent" than are copyrights and trademarks. 20 9 Courts
203. It is undoubtedly lawful-and increasingly common-that products are protected by
both copyrights and patents. See Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 638 (7th Cir. 1993).
204. Id.
205. 448 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir. 1971).
206. Id. at 50.
207. See supra notes 114-131 and accompanying text.
208. JAGER, supra note 118, § 11:02.
209. Id.
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have recognized this and have applied federal antitrust laws "with less
vigor to a trade secret license than to a patent license. '' 210
The Independent Ink ruling effectively aligned patent tie-in law with
trade secret tie-in law. This discussion of trade secrets, therefore, does
not call for a change in trade secret law, but compares trade secrets
with patents, copyrights, and trademarks to demonstrate that a rule
used in both patent and trade secret contexts should also apply to
copyrights and trademarks, given their similarities.
Unlike patent, copyright, and trademark law, which entail constitu-
tional or statutory rights of exclusion, trade secret law is a common
law protection afforded to owners while the trade secrets remain se-
cret.211 Thus, the restrictive effect on competitors associated with
trade secret rights is less than that derived from patent, copyright, and
trademark rights.212
Critics may argue that a trade secret is more exclusive than a patent,
because the patent term is limited to twenty years,213 while trade
210. Id.
211. Id. "Trade secret" is statutorily defined as follows:
[A]ll forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineer-
ing information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, de-
signs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes,
whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized
physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if-(A) the owner
thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and (B) the
information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the
public ....
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2000).
212. HOLMES, supra note 13, § 28.1 (2006) ("Normally, the competitive effect of licensing re-
straints involving trade secrets, let alone other forms of know-how, will be relatively narrow in
scope, due to the limited exclusionary reach of these forms of intellectual property."). That
trade secret protection is generally weaker than other types of intellectual property protection is
also evidenced by courts allowing broader freedom of contract in the realm of trade secret law.
See C. Rachal Pugh, Bernier v. Merrill Air Engineers, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 231, 245 (2002)
(discussing Warner-Lambert Pharm. Co. v. Reynolds, 178 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), which
held that the payment of royalties under a trade secret licensing agreement was binding even
after public disclosure of the secret, in contrast to the well-established copyright and patent
principle that, once legal protection ends, royalty payments must end). In tie-in cases where
licensing of a patented product is tied to licensing of the associated trademark, attempts to jus-
tify the continuation of royalties by arguing that the royalty could be limited to the trademark
alone will probably be unsuccessful. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1964) (holding
that enforcing a contract for the payment of royalties beyond the patent's expiration date is an
impermissible extension of the statutory patent monopoly); KALINOWSKI, supra note 18,
§ 74.01[4][b] n.75.
213. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) ("Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant shall be
for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on
which the application for the patent was filed in the United States .... ).
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secrets may be protected indefinitely. 214 However, once a trade secret
becomes public, all protection is gone. 215 Additionally, unlike patent
law, the owner of a trade secret does not have a monopoly, because
she does not have the right to "exclude all others from acquiring, us-
ing or disclosing the trade secret, regardless of how they came upon
it.' '216 Trade secret law provides a cause of action only against those
under a duty to maintain the secrecy of the information contained in
the trade secret and does not protect the trade secret holder against
one who independently develops or otherwise legitimately obtains the
secret.217
By contrast, a patent owner may prevent even innocent infringe-
ment.218 Similarly, a trademark owner may prevent trademark in-
fringement, regardless of fault, if the use of a mark is likely to cause
confusion, mistake, or deception.219 A copyright owner is specifically
granted several enumerated exclusive rights to a copyright, including
the rights to make copies, prepare derivative works, and distribute
copies and can prevent infringement of these exclusive rights, regard-
less of the intent of the alleged infringer.220 Thus, the exclusionary
rights derived from a trade secret are much narrower than those de-
rived from a patent, because they cannot prevent competitors who
"do so fairly and honestly" from developing identical trade secrets.221
It necessarily follows that "what is true for patents or copyrights
214. JAGER, supra note 118, § 11:02.
215. Id. Generally, to prove the existence of a valid trade secret, the plaintiff must prove that
the information is not generally known to others:
One who makes or vends an article which is made by a secret process or private
formula cannot appeal to the protection of any statute creating a monopoly in his prod-
uct .... The public is free to discover it if it can by fair and honest means and when
discovered, anyone has the right to use it.
HOLMES, supra note 13, § 28:1 (quoting John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 29 (6th
Cir. 1907)). See Michael Coblenz, Intellectual Property Crimes, 9 ALB. L.J. Scl. & TECH. 235,
292-93 (1999).
216. Michael J. Hutter, The Case For Adoption of A Uniform Trade Secrets Act in New York,
10 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 1, 19 (1999).
217. KAUNOWSKI. supra note 18, § 72.05. Similarly, Professor Jager stated the following:
A right of exclusion does not exist for trade secrets. A trade secret is a product of
secrecy, and ceases to exist when secrecy is lost. The trade secret owner has no monop-
oly on its use, but a proprietary right which equity protects against taking or using by
improper means. Generally, independent development, reverse engineering, and lack
of secrecy are defenses to misappropriation of trade secrets.
JAGER, supra note 118. § 11:02. Accord Coblenz, supra note 215. at 293.
218. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
219. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000).
220. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
221. HOLMES, supra note 13, § 28:1.
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should be all the more true for trade secrets, with their more limited
exclusionary impact on competitors. 22
2
IV. CONCLUSION
The Independent Ink Court correctly held that antitrust scrutiny of
tying arrangements should be the same for all products, regardless of
the type of intellectual property.223 A patent, copyright, or trademark
is no different from any other property right, and, unless the property
owner dominates its market, neither ownership nor the power to ex-
clude others conveys monopoly power. Thus, an antitrust plaintiff
must prove market power.
Yet it remains unclear whether the market power presumption is
still applicable in copyright and trademark cases. It seems illogical for
courts not to presume market power for patents and trade secrets,
given that they are on opposite ends of the intellectual property spec-
trum, but continue to presume market power for copyrights and trade-
marks. Copyrights and patents share the same policy rationale, and
the right to exclude competitors conferred by copyrights has less po-
tential for competitive harm than that of patent rights. Courts have
also historically recognized that antitrust principles that apply to pat-
ents may also apply to copyrights. Similarly, trademarks serve an im-
portant public purpose that should not be deterred, and the rights
conferred by trademarks are far less exclusionary than patent rights.
Applicability of the presumption will be confused where trademarked
products are also patented or copyrighted, and courts have applied the
logic of patent and copyright tie-in cases to trademark tie-in cases.
Trade secret rights, however, are not as similar to patents as copy-
rights and trademarks are to patents. But, even though it is much
harder to fit a trade secret into the "mold of a patent,"224 courts must
treat trade secret tie-ins and patent tie-ins the same. Therefore, the
Court should clarify that copyrights and trademarks are sufficiently
analogous to patents and trade secrets to warrant the same elimina-
tion of the market power presumption for tying arrangements.
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